(4th tetralogy : The Soul - 2nd dialogue of trilogy)

Foreword: this page is not the translation into English of its counterpart in French. It is an html version of my translation into English of the allegory of the cave directly from the Greek found in the pdf file Plato (the philosopher) : User's Guide accompanied by comments on the allegory mostly taken from this work and a few notes written for this version but it doesn't yet include a translation of the numerous notes found in the French version. That will come later.

 

René Magritte, « Human Condition » (1935) This picture by Magritte is obviously inspired by the allegory of the cave, as shown by the fact that the viewpoint assumed by the picture places the observer in a cave, and by the fire in the lower left corner, whose role is perplexing unless it is indeed meant to recall the allegory. But it would be a mistake to believe that what is seen is seen through an opening of the cave! What we see is the wall of the cave on which is displayed what our sight allows us to see, and the easel is the way of making us realize that all we see is but images, since the picture depicts part of what is visible, but without discontinuity between the picture and the rest. Thus, the picture might as well include the whole of the depicted landscape. The human condition depicted here by Magritte is the situation of the prisoners in the cave, who, unknown to them, see only images ot the world around them, those formed in the eyes.

(to previous section: The Analogy of the Line)

[514a] Now, after that, I said, liken to such an experience our nature regarding education and the fact of not being educated. Picture then men (anthrôpous) as [if they were] in a subterrean dwelling looking like a cave with a long entrance toward light spreading over the whole side of the cave, in which they are since childhood with both their legs and neck in chains, so that they stay put and [514b] see only [what’s] in front of them, unable to turn their head because of the chains; and also the light upon them of a fire above [them] and far remote[from them] burning behind them, and between the fire and the chained [prisoners] above [them] a road along which picture that a wall has been built, similar to the fences put in front of men (anthrôpôn) by wonderworkers, above which they display their wonderworks.
I see, he said.
Then see along this wall men (anthrôpous) carrying [514c] implements of all kinds rising above the wall and statues of men (andriantas) [515a] and other living animals made of wood and stone and fashioned in all possible ways, some among the bearers, as is likely, producing sounds, others being silent. (1)
Strange, he said, [is the] image you tell and strange [are the] chained prisoners!
[They are] like us, said I; for those [that are] such as this, in the first place, do you think they could have seen of themselves and the others anything other than the shadows cast under the effect of the fire on the [wall] of the cave facing them?
How indeed, he said, if they have been forced to hold their heads really motionless [515b] all their life?
What now regarding the [objects] carried along? [Would] not [it be] the same for that?
Of course.
Now, if they were able to dialogue (dialegesthai) with one another, don’t you think that, the same [things] being around [again], they would take the habit of giving names to those [things] they see? (2)
Necessarily.
What then if the prison had an echo from the [wall] facing them? Each time one of those passing by would produce sounds (phthegxaito), do you think they could suppose the one producing [those] sounds (to phtheggomenon) other than the shadow passing by?
By Zeus, certainly not me! He said.
[515c] Undoubtedly then, said I, such [persons] would hold as the true nothing but the shadows of the implements.
Most necessarily, he said.
Consider then, said I, their release and their cure from the[ir] chains and the[ir] senselessness, what it might be like if naturally such things should happen to them: when one of them would be released and compelled to suddenly stand up and turn the neck around and walk and look up toward the light, but while doing all these, would feel pain and, because of the sparklings, would be unable to distinctly see those [things] whose [515d] shadows he formerly used to see, what do you think he would say if someone told him that what he was formerly seeing was nonsense but that now, nearer to that which is and turned toward [things] that are more he should have a more correct sight, and besides, [if,] pointing out to him each of the [things] passing by, he compelled him by asking questions to answer [saying] what it is? Don’t you think that he would be at a loss and would deem the [things] he formerly used to see truer than those now pointed at?
Much more so, he said.
[515e] And then, if he were compelled to look at the light itself, [that] his eyes would feel pain and flee away turning [back] toward those [things] he is able to see and [that] he would hold them really clearer than the ones pointed at?
So [it is], he said.
And if, said I, someone should drag him thence by force through the rugged and steep ascent and would not let him go before having dragged him out into the light of the sun, wouldn’t he be distressed [516a] and angry to be dragged and, once he had come into the light, having his eyes filled with the light of the sun, unable to see a single one of the [things] now called true?
Probably not indeed, he said, at least not immediately.
Habituation (sunètheias) then, I think, [is what] he would need if he intended to see the [things] above, and first he would probably observe more easily the shadows and after that the images (eidôla) on waters of men (anthrôpôn) and the other [things], and still later [those things] themselves, and from these, he would probably more easily contemplate those in heaven and heaven itself during the night, looking toward the [516b] light of the stars and the moon, than, during the day, the sun and that of the sun.
How indeed [would] not [that be the case]?
So finally, I suppose, [it is] the sun, not reflections (phantasmata) of it on waters or some other place, but itself by itself in its own space [that] he could see clearly and contemplate as it is.
Necessarily, he said.
And after that, he would by this time conclude by way of reasoning (sullogizoito) about it that it is the one providing the seasons and the years and supervising all [516c] the [things] in the seen place and, of those [things] they themselves used to see, responsible in some way of all [of them].
[It is] clear, he said, that, after these, he would come to those [conclusions].
What then? Remembering his first dwelling and the wisdom there and his fellow-prisoners, don’t you think that he would count himself happy for the change, but pity them?
Certainly!
And honors and praises, if some [of those things] were [in use] among them at the time, and the privileges for the one most sharply observing the [things] passing by and best at remembering which ones among them used to be carried before or after [516d] or simultaneously, and as a result of this, most capable indeed of foretelling what would come, do you think he would desire them and be jealous of those among them being honored and holding power or be affected in the way Homer [depicted] and be very much willing to “be a serf bound to the land
working at another poor man’s place” and suffer anything rather than hold such opinions and live in this way?
[516e] I indeed think so, he said: accept to suffer anything rather than live in this way.
And now, reflect upon this, said I. If such a one were, coming down, to sit down again in his own seat, would not his eyes be full of darkness, having suddenly come out of the sun[light]?
Certainly indeed, he said.
But now, those shadows, if he had to compete anew with those perpetual prisoners to form judgments [on them], at a time he was dim-sighted, [517a] before his eyes had recovered–and indeed the time for habituation would not at all be short–, would he not be cause of laughter and wouldn’t it be said about him that he returns, after having climbed up there, with his eyes completely destroyed and that [it is of] no value whatsoever to attempt to go up there? And the one attempting to free them and lead them upwards, if one way or another they were able to lay hands on him and kill him, wouldn’t they kill him?
Most certainly, he said.”

(to second part : Socrates' Commentary)

(1) The diagram below stresses some of the important points in the description of the cave given by Socrates. Keeping in mind that the inside of the cave represents the visible realm and the outiside the intelligible realm, the most important point this diagram attempts to establish is that, contrary to what most pictures purporting to illustrate the allegory imply, the exit from the cave, as a close reading of Plato's text and a few deductions from what he says imply, is not behind the "fire above [ the prisoners] and far remote [from them] burning behind them" and casting on the wall of the cave facing them shadows of "implements of all kinds rising above the wall" located between them and the fire and carried by men hidden by the wall walking along a road behind the wall, and, as will be seen as we progress in the reading of the allegory, the progression of the prisoner is not toward the fire (an image of the sun, providing light to the visible realm), but toward "a long entrance toward light spreading over the whole side of the cave". Nowhere, Socrates tells us, or even suggests, that the freed prisoner moves pass the wall and toward the fire, meeting the men behind it. He only tells us that the freed prisoner "would be released and compelled to suddenly stand up and turn the neck around and walk and look up toward the light", but he doesn't say in what direction he walks, only that he (<==)

(2) The text of the second half of this sentence, starting at “the same [things]…”, comes in several variants depending on the manuscript, the editor or translator. I translate the following text: “ou tauta [stressed as a crasis of ta auta] hègei an ta paronta autous nomizein onomazein haper horôien”, which is the text given by manuscript A (Parisinus graecus 1807), usually considered the best by editors.
The variants concern three words or sequences of words (those in bold above):
- should we read the first words ou tauta with tauta stressed as a crasis of ta auta (“the same [things]”), along with manuscripts A, F and M, or as the neuter plural of houtos (“these”, referring to the carried objects mentioned in the previous sentence of Socrates), along with manuscript D and Jamblicus, or else ouk auta (suggestion of Vermehren), ouk being a variant of the negative ou before a vowel, which avoids the duplication of the article ta when auta is viewed as relating to ta paronta: “the [shadows] being present themselves”?
- is Socrates talking of ta paronta (“the [things] being around”), as can be read in manuscripts A, F, D and M, or, according to some recensions, probably influenced by the tis tôn pariontôn (“one of those passing by”) in Socrates’ next sentence, of ta parionta (“the [shadows] passing by”), or else, according to Iamblicus and Proclus followed by recent editors such as Burnet (OCT), Chambry (Budé) and more recently Slings (OCT 2003), of ta onta (“the beings”)?
- should we read nomizein onomazein (“take the habit of giving names”), as can be read in manuscripts A, D and M, nomizein alone (“hold”, another possible meaning of nomizein, derived from the root nomos, “usage, custom, law”), as can be read in manuscript F and in Proclus, or, along with Iamblicus, onomazein alone (“name”, as a verb)?
   Jowett gives the following translation: “would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?”, with a note saying “Reading paronta”, which suggests that he translated the following Greek: ou tauta [stressed as a crasis of ta auta] hègei an ta paronta autous onomazein haper horôien
   Adam (CUP) and Shorey (Loeb) give the following text: “ou tauta [stressed as neuter plural of houtos] hègèi an ta parionta autous nomizein onomazein, haper horôien”, which Shorey translates “do you not think that they would suppose that in naming the things that they saw they were naming the passing objects?” He adds in a note that “the text and the precise turn of expression are doubtful” but that “the general meaning, which is quite certain, is that they would suppose the shadows to be the realities”. This is the text translated by Cornford (who says in a note on that sentence that he translates the text of Adams) as “would they not suppose that their words referred only to those passing shadows which they saw?”, by Grube & Reeve (Hackett) as “don't you think they'd suppose that the names they used applied to the things they see passing before them?”, by Bloom (Basic Books) as “don't you believe they would hold that they are naming these things going by before them that they see?”, with a note reading “It is not certain whether the Greek was "these things going by…" or "these things present…" An alternative manuscript reading would make the sentence "…they would hold that these things that they see are the beings."” (this last reading is the one given by Burnet).
   Burnet (OCT) gives the following text: “ou tauta [stressed as neuter plural of houtos] hègèi an ta onta autous nomizein haper horôien”, which may be translated as “don’t you think they would hold for the beings these [things] that indeed they see?”
   Chambry (Budé) still adds to the richest text to come up with “ouk auta hègei an ta onta autous nomizein onomazein, onomazontas haper horôien”, which he translates in French as “ne penses-tu pas qu'ils croiraient nommer les objets réels eux-mêmes, en nommant les ombres qu'ils verraient?”, adding in a note that “le sens exigé par le contexte est: "En nommant les ombres qu'ils voient, les prisonniers ne croient-ils pas nommer les objets mêmes ?"” and explaining how he did “pour obtenir ce sens”.
   Slings, in the new OCT edition (2003), modifies the text of Burnet, replacing nomizein alone by onomazein alone, which gives “ou tauta [stressed as neuter plural of houtos] hègèi an ta onta autous onomazein haper horôien” which might be translated as “don’t you think that they would call these [things] they see the beings themselves?”.
   Reeve (Hackett 2004), who presents his translation as based on Slings’ text, paraphrases these words more than he translates them as “don’t you think they would assume that the words they used applied to the things they see passing in front fo them?”: he “translates” as if he were reading parionta in place of onta and his rendering of onomazein, which simply means “to give a name”, by “the words they used applied to…” is not translation but rich embroidery to get to the meaning he wants to read there!
If it is indeed certain that the general meaning of the allegory presented by Socrates is that the prisoners who have spent all their life chained at the bottom of the cave take the shadows for reality, I don’t think that this is the meaning of this specific sentence. It is what is said two sentences of Socrates later, at 515c1-2 (“Undoubtedly then, said I, such [persons] would hold as the true nothing but the shadows of the implements”). And it seems to me that trying to read it already in this sentence, following the Neoplatonists Iamblicus and Proclus (who are the first witnesses of the reading onta in place of paronta, that is, of the introduction of an “ontological” vocabulary in this sentence), and skip over the naming process implied by the verb onomazein is going too fast, reducing Socrates’ sentence at 515c1-2 to mere redundancy and ignoring important aspects of Plato’s text which, though only alluded to, draw our attention toward other aspects of our situation in this world.
I contend that, in this sentence referring for the first time in the allegory to the ability of the chained prisoners to talk to one another (“if they were able to dialogue (dialegesthai) with one another”), that is, to make use of the logos which differentiates the chained prisoners as anthrôpous (“human beings”) from all other animals (the alla zôia mentioned at 515a1), what this sentence is all about is the development of language, of what leads from the “sounds” produced by the bearers (a phtheggesthai) to an understandable and meaningful logos (a dialegesthai). Language, logos, and more specifically dialogos, exchange of words between persons capable of understanding one another, of which thought is but an inner version (see Theaetetus, 189e6-190a2), requires first that the mind be capable of recognizing sameness (ta auta) in what is“present” to our senses (ta paronta) despite the flux in perpetual motion (ta parionta) which causes our perceptions, and then that we agree on “names” (onomazein, the verb derived from onoma, “name”) for what is the same in multiple successive perceptions, whether it is the same object which passes by time and again or different objects having a similar look. For the dialegesthai to be possible, a “law” (nomos, at the root of the verb nomizein) of language is required (see at Cratylus, 388e7ff; the discussion about the making of language and the fact that the “maker of names”, the onomatourgos, must be a nomothetès onomata, a “lawmaker about names”, wording found at 389a5-6), resulting from common usage (nomizein). In this task of defining language, the senses, activated by what is in contact with us or close to us don’t give us the notion of “being”, but of “being there” and it is the mind which introduces in the perpetual flux of changing sensations the recognition of identity and difference required for thought and language to develop. Man is presented here not only as a logikos animal, an animal endowed with logos, but as a dialogikos animal, endowed with hè tou dialegesthai dunamis (“the power to engage in dialogue” as well as “the power resulting from the practice of dialoguing”): for him/her to really become a human being and be able to undertake his/her education, he/she must be able to dialogue with fellow prisoners, be capable of practicing logos/speech, which might lead him/her to logos/reason.
In this perspective, the choice between the reading paronta given by most manuscripts and the reading parionta, rarer in the manuscripts, becomes secondary once the reading onta of the Neoplatonists has been discarded and the reading nomizein onomazein, alluding to the process of language creation, is selected. Paronta puts the stress on the fact that what acts upon our senses only when close enough must be “present” around us while parionta puts the stress on the fugitive nature of sensible perceptions which keep changing. But these two aspects are complementary and what is most important is the repetitive (t(a )auta) characteristics the mind may discern in these sensations which keep changing, which makes it possible to give them names and thus to give birth to logos. If I have retained the reading paronta, it is both because it is that of most of the manuscripts and because the proximity of the pariontôn in the next sentence of Socrates doesn’t appear to me strong enough a reason to correct the manuscripts: the expression tis tôn pariontôn at 515b8 is masculine, as tis makes clear (“somebody”, not “something”, which would be ti) and thus refers to the bearers and not the the objects they hold, while here, ta parionta would be neuter, referring to the objects held above the wall and casting shadows. Thus, the supposition that Plato chose a different verb in each case is not implausible: when talking of the bearers, that is, the anthrôpoi who stand for the human souls, source of movement, he uses a verb describing movement, parienai (of which parionta is the present participle), while when talking of the held objects, which indeed move, but are not responsible for their movement, and more so with their cast shadows, he puts the stress on their being present to become perceptible, using the verb pareinai (of which paronta is the present participle).
Read this way, the text suggests that the development of language (logos in its most basic meaning) is a prerequisite for “metaphysical” reflection on what is “true”, “real”, and what is not, and besides, that the names themselves are only “vocal” images of “sensible” images: names are given to the shadows, not to the held objects, and even less to what is outside the cave. We may also notice, to strengthen my interpretation, that the next sentence of Socrates introduces another condition of this reflection: mentioning the fact that some of these shadows may also seem to produce sounds, it introduces the problem of the multiplicity of senses (sight, hearing and so on) and of what Aristotle calls the “common sense”, that is, what allows us to perceive, behind the multiplicity of sensible impressions from the various senses, the unity of what is at their origin. And it is not necessary, to state the problem, to make an inventory of all our senses: two are enough, here sight and hearing (the two senses precisely chosen by Socrates in one of his attempts to define the beautiful with Hippias at Greater Hippias, 297e-303d).
It is only once we have made sure that, in the “analogy”, those who “picture” us are, as is the case for us, endowed with logos, root of the dialegesthai, and of more than one sense, which makes it possible to realize that what is at the source of what we perceive with one or another of our senses is not limited to what this sense allows us to grasp of it, and thus opens a space between sensible perceptions and what causes them, which may make the start of an ascent toward “ideas”possible, that we reach a point where we may benefit from the identification of “ground zero” of knowledge for the prisonners, that which consists in supposing that the shadows are the “truth”.
The handling of this dubious text by various scholars is a good example of what happens when people, rather than trying to understand what Plato wrote, want to find in what they read what they would like Plato to have written to fit in their preconceived notion of what Plato said. Shorey, who precisely wrote a book called “What Plato said”, even justifies such an approach on his part in notes to his translation: the one I quoted above about the dubious text here analyzed, where he writes “the general meaning, which is quite certain, is that they would suppose the shadows to be the realities”, which is not false, but doesn’t apply to this specific sentence, and a note on 516a8-b2, further on in the allegory (“he would probably more easily contemplate those in heaven and heaven itself during the night, looking toward the light of the stars and the moon, than, during the day, the sun and that of the sun”) in which he writes: “It is probably a mistake to look for a definite symbolism in all the details of this description. There are more stages of progress than the proportion of four things calls for. All that Plato's thought requires is the general contrast between an unreal and a real world, and the goal of the rise from one to the other in the contemplation of the sun, or the idea of good, Cf. 517 B-C.”, which should be “translated” as “I could not find a definite symbolism in all the details of this description and fit it with the analogy of the line. But all that my understanding of Plato's thought requires is the general contrast between an unreal and a real world, and the goal of the rise from one to the other in the contemplation of the sun, or the idea of good, so trust me and don’t nitpick on the details of the allegory, just enjoy the show!” I hope I have made clear in my analysis of the allegory how careful Plato was in writing, selecting his terms and making sure that the tiniest details of his image had meaning and contributed to the overall “message” of the allegory so that the reader may now see how wrong Shorey was in not taking the time to look for “a definite symbolism in all the details of this description”. He was right in defending “The unity of Plato’s thought” (the title of one of his works), but he was wrong in his way of understanding “What Plato said” (the title of another of his works) because he preferred to ignore the details in Plato’s text which didn’t fit into his overall understanding rather than spend (“waste” for him) time on the details of Plato’s text and adjust his understanding to accommodate all the details that Plato put in his text with an extraordinary mastery.

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