(4th tetralogy : The Soul - 2nd dialogue of trilogy)

Foreword: this page is not the translation into English of its counterpart in French. It is an html version of my translation into English of the comments of Socrates on the allegory of the cave directly from the Greek found in the pdf file Plato (the philosopher) : User's Guide and it doesn't include a translation of the numerous notes found in the French version. That will come later.

 (to first part : The Allegory of the Cave)

[517a]...
Now, this image, said I, my dear Glaucon, [517b] must be applied in full to what has been said earlier, likening on the one hand the place revealed through sight to the dwelling in the prison, the light of the fire in it on the other hand to the power of the sun; now, by holding that the ascent up high and the contemplation of the [things] up there [is] the upward path of the soul (psuchè) towards the intelligible place, you will not be mistaken about the very expectation of mine, since you desire to hear about it. But a god, perhaps, knows whether it chances to be true. But anyway what appears to me appears in this way: in the knowable, the ultimate [thing to be known] is the [517c] idea of the good (hè tou agathou idea), and it is seen with great difficulty, but once seen, it must be apprehended by way of reasoning (sullogistea einai) as [being] indeed in all things responsible for all that is right and beautiful, begetting in the visible light and its lord, and in the intelligible, lord itself providing truth and intelligence, and that whoever is to act sensibly either in private or public [affairs] must see it.
I myself am of the same opinion, he said, at least insofar as I am able.
Come on, then, said I, and be of the same opinion about this and don’t wonder that those who have come there don’t wish to occupy themselves with the [affairs] of human beings but that their souls are always eager to spend / waste their time up high. [517d] For [it is] likely, I guess, [that it be] so, if, here again, this happens according to the image previously depicted.
Probably indeed, he said.
What then? Do you think this something to wonder about if, from divine (theiôn) contemplations, said I, someone returning to the evil human [affairs / behaviors / deeds / thoughts /…] doesn’t look good and appears most ridiculous [when] still dim-sighted and before having properly become habituated to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled, in a tribunal or somewhere else, to fight for the shadows of justice or the statues whose shadows they are, and to strive earnestly [517e] for that: how in the world could this be conceived by those who have never seen justice itself?
[It is] in no way a cause of wonder, he said.
[518a] But someone having a [sensible] mind should remember that two disturbances happen in the eyes from two [causes]: when changing from light to darkness and from darkness to light. Believing therefore that the same happens also to the soul, each time he would see one confused and unable to see something, he would not laugh thoughtlessly, he would examine whether, coming from a brighter life, it has been blinded by the lack of habituation or, coming from greater ignorance to [something] brighter, it has been filled full under [the effect of] more shining sparklings, [518b] and thus indeed he would consider the one happy because of this affection and life and pity the other, and if he wanted to laugh at the latter, his laughter would be less laughable than the [laughter] at the one coming down from the light above.
Certainly, he said, you speak with measure.
So, we must, I said, hold the following about these [matters], if this is true: education is not such as some [people] making profession of it say it is. They say indeed more or less that [518c] they themselves put knowledge into the soul in which it is not present as if putting sight into blind eyes.
They do say [that] indeed, he said.
But in fact the current account, said I, signifies that this power is present in the soul of each one and that the organ by which each one learns, in the same way as an eye which would not be able to turn from the dark toward the bright otherwise than with the whole body, must be turned around with the whole soul from the [realm of] becoming until it might, in [the realm of] what is and the brightest part of what is, become able to withstand contemplating [it]. And this, we say, is [518d] the good, isn’t it?
Yes.
Of this, then, said I, there should be an art / technique (technè), of this very turning around, of the way by which it will be turned around most easily and most efficiently, not to produce in it the [ability to] see, but, because of its having it but not turning it properly and not looking at what it ought to, to make it work properly.
It seems likely indeed, he said.
Then, the other so-called “virtues / perfections” (aretai) of the soul run the risk of being something akin to those of the body, for, in reality, [518e] not being present at first, they are produced later by habit and practice, while that of thinking, it seems, run the risk of being something much more divine, which never loses its power but, depending on its revolution, becomes usefull and beneficial [519a] or on the contrary useless and harmful. Or have you never realized, about those who are said bad, but wise, how sharply their petty soul watches and how acutely it sees through what it turns toward, because of its not having a poor sight, but being forced to serve evil so that the sharper it sees, the more evil [deeds] it performs.
Of course I have, he said.
Yet, said I, this [petty soul] of such a nature, if, having been trimmed straight from childhood, it had been trimmed all around [to get rid of] the [parts] similar to leaden weights akin to [519b] becoming having become outgrowths due to eating and similar pleasures and gluttony turning the vision of the soul downward; if, having been set free of those, it was turned around toward the true [objects of sight], this [petty soul] itself of the same men would also see those more acutely, like those towards which it is presently turned.
Probably indeed, he said.
What then? [Is] not this probable, said I, and necessary based on what was said earlier: neither those uneducated and ignorant of truth [519c] would ever adequately manage a city, not those allowed to spend / waste their time in education till the end, the ones for not having a single aim in life aiming at which they must do everything they do privately and publicly, the others because they will not voluntarily do [it], thinking they have already been carried alive into the islands of the blessed?
True, he said.
Then our task, said I, as founders of the city, is to force the best natures to come to the object of learning which we said before to be the greatest, to see the good [519d] and to undertake this ascent and provided, after having ascended, they have seen adequately, not permit them what is now permitted.
What’s that, then?
To stay around it, said I, and not be willing to go down again among those prisonners and take part in their labors and honors, whether most trivial or most serious.